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Abstract: This paper analyses how, despite the universalist and inclusive 
vocation of secularism, this has become the main argument for the exclusion of 
Muslim religious practices, with the consequent limitation of individual liberties. 
Thus, an institution thought as a procedure to guarantee the equality of the citizens 
through the differentiation between the political and religious spheres becomes a 
feature that defines the identity of Europe and that it is necessary to defend against 
the accommodation demands raised by Muslim immigrants. Obviously, it is not 
possible to establish a cause-effect relationship, but the climate of hostility towards 
the cultural difference spread by the entry into several European polities of radical 
right parties, clearly hostile to Islam and Muslims, could be influencing, in some 
way, the political orientation of European governments in this regard.
Keywords: Multiculturalism, immigration, citizenship, secularism.
Resumen: Este artículo analiza el modo en que, a pesar de su vocación uni-
versal e inclusiva, el secularismo se ha convertido en el principal argumento para la 
exclusión de prácticas religiosas musulmanas con la consiguiente limitación de las 
libertades individuales. Así, una institución concebida como un procedimiento para 
garantizar la igualdad de los ciudadanos mediante la diferenciación de las esferas 
política y religiosa, se vuelve una característica que define la identidad europea y 
que debe defenderse frente a los reclamos de acomodación planteados por los inmi-
grantes musulmanes. Si bien todo indica que no es posible establecer una relación 
causa-efecto, el clima de hostilidad hacia la diferencia cultural que se abre paso 
con el auge de partidos de extrema derecha en Europa, con un rechazo hacia el Is-
lam y los musulmanes, podría estar influenciando, hasta cierto punto, la orientación 
política de algunos gobiernos europeos en esta materia.
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I. Introduction
The countries of Europe are defining their way of managing cultural 
pluralism in a context marked by discourses and policies that oscillate be-
tween the universalism of human rights as inspired by European institu-
tions—as well as the materialization of those rights in institutions such as 
citizenship and state neutrality—and the nationalist, exclusionary particu-
larism that is disseminated by parties of the extreme right, among others. 
These circumstances place us at a crossroads where what is at play is not 
only the ability of our institutions to integrate, but our commitment to the 
values of the Enlightenment and liberal democracy that are at the core of 
the European project.
This paper presents some of the difficulties affecting the management 
of the religious diversity that has been created by immigration in Europe 
beginning with a conceptual analysis of two institutions that have helped 
us guarantee equal status to all members of a political community, regard-
less of their identity, and, more specifically, to accommodate the beliefs 
of minority groups: citizenship and secularism. Are these two institutions 
truly inclusive under current circumstances? To what extent do they help 
us manage cultural and religious diversity in a context of immigration? De-
spite their universalist, inclusive vocation, both institutions have an exclu-
sionary and particularistic side, as has been revealed in the question of reli-
gious symbols in Europe.
This paper will also reflect, more specifically, on the reason European 
countries have chosen to ban Islamic religious symbols in the public space, 
even though their commitment to the universalism of neutrality and citizen-
ship should have made them guarantee Muslims the same status as those 
who maintain majoritarian beliefs. I defend the thesis that political debates 
on this question have ended up imposing a particularism with two manifes-
tations.
First, a “moderate”1 or “modest”2 secularism, in which Christian refer-
ences remain, at least, as a cultural trait that we need to keep for the sake of 
social cohesion. Second and most common, a specific version of secularism 
that moves beyond merely being an institutional procedure for achieving 
equality and ends up becoming a trait that defines the identity of Europe/
the country and that it is necessary to defend against the Other, in this case, 
Muslims and their demands of accommodation. In this way, an institution 
1 Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism and Moderate Secularism”, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2015/47 (2015).
2 Rajeev Bhargava, “How Secular Is European Secularism?”, European Societies 16, 3 
(2014): 329.
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that, in principle, would have an inclusive character turns into the main ar-
gument for the exclusion of certain practices.
It is obviously not possible to establish a cause-effect relationship, but 
the climate of hostility toward cultural difference that has been spread by 
having radical right parties that are clearly hostile to Islam and Muslims en-
ter into several European polities could, in some way, be influencing the 
political orientation of governments in this regard.
II.  Citizenship and secularism: between universalism and 
particularism
The increase and greater visibility of religious diversity in Europe as a 
consequence of immigration has made evident the tensions between the dif-
ferent components of what some authors have called the “Holy Trinity of 
Modernity”3, in other words, the inseparable union between state (sover-
eignty, territory), nation (cultural identity) and citizenship (rights)4. This in-
stitution that has, since modernity, helped us organize belonging and equal-
ity in the entitlement of rights contains a contradiction between universal 
inclusion and particularistic exclusion. If the goal of citizenship is to guar-
antee the equality of rights, overcoming the “hereditary distinctions” that 
the 1791 French Constitution believed to be surmounted by “the common 
rights of the French”, its logical consequence is the inclusion of individu-
als regardless of their specific identity. A concrete institutional embodi-
ment of this universalism is state neutrality when it comes to different reli-
gious creeds. But this universalist project contains the “paradox of political 
modernity”5, which is that its effective realization depends upon belonging 
to a particular national state with its territorial and identity demarcations 
which, therefore, excludes from physical and symbolic state borders any in-
dividuals and cultures that are different.
The context in which the European countries face the management of 
the religious diversity that is generated by immigration is characterized 
by the confrontation between those two aspects of citizenship. In the first 
place, universalism—the logic of inclusion as equals—which is inscribed in 
the very definition of citizenship and is, beyond mere academic debates, ad-
3 Gerd Baumann, El enigma multicultural. Un replanteamiento de las identidades nacio-
nales, étnicas y religiosas (Barcelona: Paidós, 2001).
4 Dominique Schnapper, La comunidad de los ciudadanos. Acerca de la idea moderna 
de nación (Madrid: Alianza, 2001).
5 Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict: Shadows of modernity 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2002).
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vocated by both the Council of Europe and the European Union in its direc-
tives on the integration of immigrants.
Thereby, the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, “Living Together 
as Equals in Dignity”, launched by the Council of Europe in 2008 on the 
occasion of the celebration of the year of intercultural dialogue, set a range 
of principles and values that should guide the governance of cultural plural-
ism, underscoring “the dignity of every human being, over and above the 
entitlements enjoyed by individuals as citizens of a particular state”6. Thus, 
the paper continues, “no undue restriction must be placed on the exercise of 
human rights, including by non-citizens. Given the universal character of 
human rights, of which minority rights —inter alia cultural, linguistic and 
participatory rights— are an integral part, it is of utmost importance to en-
sure the full enjoyment of human rights by everyone”7. In the field of the 
European Union, with its goal of affording “fair treatment of third country 
nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member State”, the Tam-
pere European Council recommended “granting them rights and obligations 
comparable to those of EU citizens”8, from which the recognition of rights 
derives, regardless of the possession of citizenship. Along the same lines, 
The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU, 
adopted in November 2004, setting the foundations of EU initiatives in the 
field of integration, declares that “the practice of diverse cultures and reli-
gions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be 
safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights 
or with national law”9.
In opposition to this universalism, there is a tendency toward particular-
ism, a “neo-nationalism”10 that is manifested in two senses. In the first place, 
although the Tampere Summit recommends that the legal status of third-
country nationals be as similar as possible to the status of citizens, in fact, 
belonging to a particular national community is what guarantees “the right 
to have rights” and not the mere gratuitous concession of areas of free action 
which are, therefore, reversible on the part of governments. In other words, 
citizens are the only ones entitled to demand rights from the state and to file 
6 Council of Europe, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. Living Together as Equals 
in Dignity (2008): 17.
7 Ibidem 41.
8 Council of the European Union, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999. 
Presidency Conclusions (1999).
9 Council of the European Union. Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration 
Policy in the EU (2004).
10 Per Mouritsen, “Beyond postnational citizenship. Access, consequence, conditional-
ity”, in European multiculturalisms: Cultural, religious and ethnic challenges, ed. by Anna 
Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood and Naser Meer (Edinburgh: University Press, 2011), 88-115.
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a claim if they find themselves deprived of some of them; fundamentally, 
the right to enter and settle in a territory, the right to enjoy the benefits of the 
welfare state and finally, regarding our topic of concern, the right—beyond 
mere tolerance—to recreate their own cultural and religious practices. This 
is the underlying logic of discourses that emphasize a national preference 
when it comes to access to the labour market or social benefits.
In addition, universalism and the resulting tendency toward inclusion 
also conflict with the need to safeguard the cultural values that define belong-
ing and social cohesion in this specific country, which is also derived from 
the institutional articulation of the idea of citizenship that I referenced above. 
Furthermore, in the current context, this concern about identity refers, funda-
mentally, to the integration of people of Muslim origin, who are perceived as 
bearers of values that are completely foreign to the Western democracies.
Both the idea of national preference and the need to defend the val-
ues that are the basis for social cohesion are characteristic of the discourse 
of the extreme right, which, in some sense, could be creating a climate of 
opinion that is opposed to diversity, affecting the policies for managing cul-
tural pluralism in Europe11. It is this second aspect—the opposition to cul-
tural pluralism—that it is most interesting to analyse for this paper.
III. A threatened identity
One of the slogans of the Front National is “the identity imperative” 
(“L’ímperatif d’identité”)12, which alludes to the culture that defines us 
and that we need to defend from foreign threat. That identity is consid-
ered, first of all, as a homogeneous block, that does not, consequently, ac-
cept cultural pluralism. Therefore, the reference to “German as dominant 
culture instead of multiculturalism” (Deutsche Leitkultur statt Multikultur-
alismus) has been a recurring slogan for that country’s extreme right for 
years, highlighted by Alternative für D eutschland13, as Die Republikaner 
previously did14. Furthermore, an expression of the actual political influ-
11 Innerarity, Carmen and Beatriz Acha. “Los discursos sobre ciudadanía e inmigración 
en Europa: universalismo, extremismo y educación”, Política y Sociedad, 47 (2010): 63-84.
12 Front National (FN). 144 Engagements présidentiels (2017).
13 Alternative für Deutschland. Program für Deutschland (2017).
14 Manz, Stefan. “Constructing a normative national identity: The Leitkultur debate in 
Germany, 2000/2001”, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 25, 5 (2004): 
481-496; Bassan Tibi Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft 
(München: Bertelsmann, 1998); Basan Tibi “Die Ideologie des Multikulturalismus, nicht die 
Idee der kulturellen Vielfalt ist in der Sackgasse”, in Multikulturalismus: Vision oder Illu-
sion?, Heinrchh Böll Stiftung. Heimatkunde. Migrations Politisches Portal (2010).
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ence of the right-wing parties is the fact that this kind of topic has spread 
from the far right to other parties. Thus, for example, the CSU also advo-
cates for the German Leitkultur, while explicitly rejecting multiculturalism. 
“Integration means being guided by our Leitkultur, not by multiculturalism; 
we reject multiculturalism”15, as the platform prepared for the recent parlia-
mentary elections vehemently affirms. In the same way, the Österreichis-
che Volkspartei (ÖVP), the Austrian Christian-Democratic party, which has 
just agreed to form a coalition government with the Freiheitliche Partei Ös-
terreichs (FPÖ), as it already did between 1999 and 2002, points out in its 
electoral platform: “The FPÖ is committed to the homeland, the native peo-
ple and to protecting Austrian Leitkultur”16.
This defence of identity is based on a concept of Europe/the country not 
only as a homogeneous block, but also as a static identity that draws only 
from its Greco-Roman origins and that has remained unaffected for centu-
ries by the presence of peoples with different cultural baggage. In addition, 
since the expulsion of the Jews and Muslims from Spain in 1492, the con-
trast between us—the Europeans—and the Other, among whom the Mus-
lims play a leading role, has been continually strengthened, not only in that 
country, but all around Europe (Martín Muñoz 2012). That is why, for ex-
ample, AfD’s platform emphasizes the idea that “Islam does not belong to 
Germany”17, echoing the polemic that arose in that country in 2010 as a re-
sult of the declarations of then president of the Republic, Christian Wulff, 
on the occasion of the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of 
German unification. This generated an important debate in German public 
opinion, and Angela Merkel herself intervened various times, until recently 
closing the discussion that had even been launched in the heart of her own 
party, affirming categorically in the electoral debate with Schulz last sum-
mer that Islam belongs to the German society18.
In any case, an “identitarian movement”19 underlies the rejection of 
Muslim immigration. If the stigmatizing of immigrants in the 1980s pri-
marily referred to “social danger”, the turn of the century has produced a 
“transformation of the social question of integration into an unsurmounta-
ble and antagonistic question of identity”20.
15 Alternative für Deutschland. Program für Deutschland (2017).
16 Österreichische Volkspartei. Wahlprogram (2017).
17 Alternative für Deutschland. Program für Deutschland (2017).
18 https://www.zdf.de/politik/wahlen/tv-duell-merkel-schulz-100.html
19 Sami Naïr, Refugiados. Frente a la catástrofe humanitaria, una solución real (Barce-
lona: Crítica, 2016): 138.
20 Ibidem 136.
Illiberal Secularism. Fake Inclusion through Neutrality Carmen Innerarity Grau
Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto 
ISSN: 1130-8354 • ISSN-e: 2445-3587, Núm. 59/2018, Bilbao, págs. 45-61 
 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-59-2018pp45-61 • http://ced.revistas.deusto.es 51
More precisely, since the 1990s, there is a tendency in Europe to la-
bel immigrants based on their religious identity rather than ethnic or geo-
graphic origin. This also occurs in a context in which the debates are cen-
tred on Muslims and on the possibility of their integration, at the same time 
as their religion is associated with a strong potential for conflict. That is 
why there is a rejection of “religiously dangerous” immigrants, thus rein-
forcing the contrast between us and the Other: Islam as opposed to the val-
ues of Western democracy. This is an “acculturation of social problems”21 
that attributes any controversial question to religious beliefs and to group 
identity. Muslim immigrants, considered the principal bearers of values that 
are different and even contrary to those held by Western democracies, are 
now the principal target of a discourse filled with islamophobia, which ac-
quires particular force at a time characterized by the social crisis, insecu-
rity, unemployment and, especially, the crisis of institutions that used to 
contribute to social integration, such as schools, labour unions or political 
parties22.
In these circumstances, the presence in the public space of immigrants 
who are labelled as members of a religious group and their claims-mak-
ing upon European governments are both viewed as a specific challenge to 
Western identity. “The religious Other now seems to be the immigrant that 
shows belief in public, one whose observance is revealed in public through 
particular social uses and by their way of dressing”23. That “deprivatization 
of religion”24, aiming for public recognition, especially of a non-European 
religion, is leading to an increase of assertions in European societies of both 
a “Christian cultural identity”25 and, further still, of Enlightenment secu-
larism. As Angela Merkel stated: “We feel tied to Christian values. Those 
who don’t accept them don’t have a place here”26. This is a cultural affir-
mation of Christian values, which does not necessarily have to be accompa-
nied by an increase in religious practice, as Giscard d’Estaing noted about 
21 Anna Triandafyllidou, “Diversity, Integration, Secularism and Multiculturalism”, in 
European Multiculturalisms, ed. by Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood and Naser Meer 
(London: Palgrave, 2011): 47.
22 Michel Wieviorka, El racismo. Una introducción (Barcelona: Gedisa, 2009).
23 Moreras Jordi, “Migraciones y pluralismo religioso. Elementos para el debate”. Docu-
mentos CIDOB Migraciones n. 9 (Barcelona: CIDOB, 2006): 50.
24 José Casanova “Immigration and the new religious pluralism”, in Secularism, reli-
gion and multicultural citizenship, edited by Geoffry Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (Cam-
bridge: University Press, 2010): 141.
25 Tariq Modood “Post-Immigration ‘difference’ and Integration: The Case of Muslims 
in Western Europe”, in New Paradigms in Public Policy, ed. by Peter Taylor-Gooby (Oxford: 
University Press, 2013): 51.
26 http://www.voxeurop.eu/de/content/article/363851-multikulti-ein-wort-ist-tot
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the inclusion of a symbolic reference to Christianity in the preamble to the 
failed European constitution: “I never go to church, but Europe is a Chris-
tian continent”. Europe is seen, thus, as a “secular Christian”27 entity. It is a 
belonging without believing, in the sense that the religious tradition remains 
inscribed in the social memory, although it is not necessarily expressed 
through observance. These religions endure “as significant cultural systems 
and as imagined communities in competition with other imagined national 
communities”28. This explains, for example, the fact that Europeans may 
protest against the construction of mosques, even if they never set foot in a 
church29.
But, in addition, Islamic immigrants and religious practices generate re-
jection not only because of being an expression of religious otherness but, 
especially, because of their religiosity itself, because of their otherness in 
relation to European secularization: it is not the private practice of religion 
but its presence and visibility in the public sphere and their claims-making 
in the Western secular state. Secularism considered “as a quasi-normative 
consequence of being a modern and enlightened Europe”30. Secularism is, 
thus, not only a means to protect religious freedom in its different aspects 
and expressions but has indeed become “a mark of western identity”31. 
Logically, in this context, labelling a group by their religious identity—as 
is the case with immigrants from Muslim countries—and their demands 
for accommodation in the public sphere seem to erode the separation that 
secularism has attempted to establish between the political and religious 
spheres that is “part of a narrative of western exceptionality”32. Therefore, 
distrust toward Muslim communities does not stem so much from the mere 
fact of religious otherness, nor is it even a result of it being a non-Christian 
and non-European religion, which is also true, but more than anything from 
their religiosity, which is seen as “the Other” against which European secu-
larity must be defended.
Both aspects—Christianity and secularism—are emphasized by the ex-
tremists in their defence of national identity. On the one hand, some plat-
forms reference Christianity expressly as an integral aspect of European 
identity, which clearly contrasts with Islam. In their platform, AfD affirms: 
27 Modood, “Post-Immigration ‘difference’ and Integration: The Case of Muslims in 
Western Europe”, 53.
28 José Casanova, Religiones públicas en el mundo moderno (Madrid: PPC, 2004): 30.
29 Moreras, “Migraciones y pluralismo religioso. Elementos para el debate”, 16.
30 Casanova, “Immigration and the new religious pluralism”, 144.
31 S. Sayyid “Contemporary politics of secularism”, in Secularism, religion and multi-
cultural citizenship, ed. by Geoffry Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (Cambridge: University 
Press, 2010): 188.
32 Sayyid, “Contemporary politics of secularism”, 189.
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“This culture is derived from three sources: the first of which is the Chris-
tian religious tradition”. FPÖ emphasizes: “Christianity, the foundation of 
Europe”. But, beyond these allusions to the Christian religion, they all hold 
that secularism is an important aspect of European identity that is suppos-
edly in danger and that needs to be protected from external threats, fun-
damentally Islam and its demands. Evidence of that close relationship be-
tween secularity and identity is the fact that, in FN’s platform for the last 
presidential elections, the reference to neutrality is found within the chap-
ter dedicated to identity. “The nation through identity” (“La nation par 
l’identité”), it proclaims, in clear agreement with the typically French idea 
that la laïcité—the local version of state neutrality—is a characteristic as-
pect of national identity.
These references both to Christian values and to secularism as a mark 
of European identity reveal the “neo-nationalism” to which I have al-
luded previously. A particularism which could have led to restrictive meas-
ures when it comes to Islamic claims, in particular, the measures regard-
ing Islamic religious symbols adopted by several European countries, even 
though their commitment to universalism and neutrality should have led 
them to guarantee Muslims the same status as members of the majority 
group in the exercise of their religious freedom.
IV. An example: Muslim religious symbols
All Western democracies respect and protect the private practice of re-
ligion, including Islam, as a fundamental individual right, and this is the 
meaning of state neutrality.
We can define secularism in general as a political regime that estab-
lishes a separation between politics and religion, states and religious creeds, 
with the goal of protecting the equality of individual rights. However, prob-
lems arise when we try to determine with greater precision what neutral-
ity means or to apply it to the management of concrete questions, such as 
the conflict stemming from the publication of caricatures of Muhammad 
or from the use of the Islamic veil. As a general rule, each European coun-
try has recreated its particular model of the separation between church and 
state and the accommodation of its minorities, with consequences that are 
more or less hospitable to the presence of religion in the public space. In 
France, la laïcité demands the strict privatization of religion. Great Britain 
maintains the Official Anglican Church, but it has shown great openness 
toward religious diversity. Germany recognizes the social function of reli-
gions and allows them to appear in the public sphere, insisting, at the same 
time, on the importance of the Christian tradition for social cohesion.
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But, regardless of the different national styles of managing religious di-
versity, the challenge perceived in the public and collective practice of Is-
lam has led secularism reveal its most particularistic and excluding face. 
That is why the tendency here has been quite restrictive regarding the pres-
ence of Islam in the public space, demanding it be confined to the private 
sphere, paradoxically, with the goal of protecting the European tradition of 
liberal tolerance from the antiliberal and fundamentalist threat that is per-
ceived in Muslim immigrants.
This is, for example, the case in France. In the first conflicts that arose 
in that country at the end of the 1980s, the Islamic veil was tolerated out 
of a liberal understanding of secularism. In this sense, it is an institution 
whose purpose is to safeguard individual rights, more specifically, the equal 
treatment of religions and equality in the freedom of religious practice, both 
in its negative and its positive sense. It is, then, a universalistic institution 
that aims to include individuals without considering their identity. How-
ever, following the report of the Stasi Commission in 2003, the law on reli-
gious signs of 2004 banned “conspicuous symbols”, the symbols that make 
identity differences visible in the public sphere, overturning the previous 
liberal tolerance for the headscarf. This law, then, includes a republican un-
derstanding of secularism, according to which citizens must leave behind 
their religious identity or community belonging before entering the public 
sphere. This secularism “is part of our collective history”33, “it is an ele-
ment of the republican pact”34, a political project in which individuals be-
come free to engage in public life without the impediment of ascribed re-
ligious membership. La laïcité is a concept that has been developing over 
time, and it is now seen as a thread that defines French identity that must be 
defended against the visibility of religious belonging that derives from the 
use of the veil35.
The ban on ostensible religious symbols in France constitutes, in this 
way, an extreme example of illiberal secularism, which imposes important 
costs to religious liberty based on the defence of the political project that 
defines us and includes secularism as a fundamental feature.
In the case of Germany, there have been two arguments present in the 
debate about the Islamic veil. The first of them is neutrality understood in 
33 Bernard Stasi, Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la 
Republique: rapport au Président de la République (2003): 1.1.
34 Stasi Commission 2003, 1.2.2.
35 Carmen Innerarity, “La polémica sobre los símbolos religiosos en Francia. La laicidad 
republicana como principio de integración”, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológi-
cas, 111 (2005): 160; Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Laicidad y libertad de conciencia 
(Madrid: Alianza, 2011): 26.
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two different and yet complementary fashions. In the first place, as a dis-
tancing of the state from religion, which does not imply the prohibition of 
any religious manifestation in the public space, but—in the second sense—
it is a positive secularity, open to religious fact and to the plurality of con-
victions: a “disposition open to protecting the freedom of all religious 
creeds to the same extent … to guarantee space for the active acknowl-
edgement of religious convictions”36. This way of understanding neutral-
ity would imply a general acceptance of the presence of symbols from any 
creed in the public space and promoting, at the same time, equitable treat-
ment for all of them. It would, therefore, be an institution with a universal-
ist and inclusive nature. But, in a similar fashion to what has taken place in 
France, this universalist argument of the debate has confronted a second el-
ement of an identity-based and, therefore, exclusionary nature. If it was, in 
France, republican secularism understood as one of the country’s defining 
characteristics, here it is the idea of Germany as a society based on Chris-
tian traditions and values. This is expressly stipulated in the constitutions of 
some Länder, such as North Rhine-Westphalia: schools shall educate chil-
dren, “on the basis of Christian educational and cultural values and shall 
be open to Christian denominations and to other religious and ideological 
convictions”37, combining that sense of open and inclusive secularity and 
the express reference to Christian values as something that the education 
system should transmit with an eye to social cohesion. However, this fi-
nal argument, along with an idea of exclusionary neutrality, is what led six-
teen Länder to prohibit religious symbols, with the exception, in some of 
them, of religious symbols from Western traditions38. The case of Germany 
is, thus, a clear example of that “moderate secularism”39, which defines a 
style of “flexible separation”40 and which is the model that actually exists in 
most European countries.
36 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1436/02 Absatz-Nr. (1-140) (3.6.2003): 43.
37 Verfassung für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, art. 7.1. https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/
br_bes_text?anw_nr=2&gld_nr=1&ugl_nr=100&bes_id=3321&aufgehoben=N&menu= 
1&sg=0 . Art. 12
38 In fact, in 2015, the German Constitutional Court found unconstitutional both the gen-
eral prohibition—because it infringes upon the fundamental rights of the Constitution—and 
especially the selective prohibition—for being discriminatory. It must be examined whether 
state neutrality is actually in question in each particular case (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1BvR 
471/10 (27.01.2015).
39 Modood, “Multiculturalism and Moderate Secularism”, 2015.
40 Philippe Portier, “State regulation of religion in Western European countries”, in Fran-
çois Foret and Xabier Itçaina, eds. of Politics of religion in Western Europe. Modernities in 
conflict (London: Routledge, 2012): 99.
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In both countries, particularism has prevailed over universalistic pro-
cedures that exist in their respective political cultures and that would have 
allowed an open attitude toward diversity. It is a liberal understanding of 
secularism, seeking equal protection of individual liberty in France, or, in 
Germany, the idea of open neutrality and positive secularism, which guar-
antees the same status to different creeds. These are institutional procedures 
that not only seek the separation of church and state, but also—and perhaps 
more appropriately for managing current religious pluralism—seek to en-
sure equal treatment of all religions. However, in both of them, the debate 
between universalism and particularism has ended up stressing the latter, 
with the consequent inability to manage pluralism in an inclusive way. For 
this reason, both countries abandon the universalist goal inscribed in the 
institutions of citizenship and neutrality. In Germany, it has been the idea 
of  the Christian tradition as a feature of its identity that must be protected 
against religious pluralism in order to guarantee social cohesion. In France, 
it is secularism also seen as a defining feature of its identity. Both France 
and Germany have made decisions that help reinforce the division between 
us and them. In France, between us—secularists—and them—groups that 
are looking for public recognition through permission for their specific way 
of dressing. In Germany, between us—cultural Christians—and them—
groups that portray a religion we see as strange. Policies developed in both 
countries are a challenge to pluralism and equality and both “threaten to 
create a long-term racialised-religious division in Europe”41
V. Conclusion
In addition to references to the Christian Western tradition in Germany, 
the fundamental argument for exclusion has been secularism. A secular-
ism that has moved from being a procedural institution for the protection 
of equality and religious freedom to become a specific feature of European 
identity that must be defended, in this case, against Islam and Muslims. It is 
a “fundamentalist secularism”42, encouraged by the extreme right, among 
others, and manifested in illiberal measures of restricting religion liberties 
in the public space, demanding Islam be confined to the private sphere. A 
liberalism that transforms into an identity, an ethical way of life to which 
everyone is expected to conform and with exclusionary effects in liberal-
41 Modood “Post-Immigration ‘difference’ and Integration: The Case of Muslims in 
Western Europe”, 54.
42 June Edmunds, “The limits of post-national citizenship: European Muslims, human 
rights and the Hijab”. Ethnic and Racial Studies, n. 35, 7 (2011).
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ism’s presumed “Other”, that is Islam and its claims in the public sphere. 
A liberalism which is in the core of European values and which, with a uni-
versalist language—such as the language of secularism, becomes, in fact, 
an ideology that is particularistic and exclusionary.
Therefore, and to conclude, I would like to emphasise two ideas. In 
the first place, European governments should pay attention, not so much to 
the procedure—secularism—as to the aims that this institution intends to 
achieve—the freedom and equality of individuals. Current debates on this 
subject tend to focus more on procedure than on values, turning secularism 
into something to be defended at any price, and not into a means that needs 
to be defined according to its capacity to achieve its intended ends: equality 
and freedom, beyond individual identity.
Second, we need to rethink the meaning of secularism in the current 
circumstances, a concept developed in and for a context of single-religion 
societies and which aimed at the separation of church and state, religion 
and politics. The goal of that procedure today is not only the differentia-
tion of spheres, but granting the same status to the plurality of religions 
that live in Europe. The governance of multicultural societies requires, 
thus, a great effort by governments to formulate more positive and less de-
fensive narratives about the increasing cultural diversity of Western soci-
eties. Therefore, Europe should move from viewing Islam as a threat to 
secularism to considering it as an opportunity to shift to a concept of secu-
larism more appropriate to a context of deep religious pluralism, otherwise 
Muslim citizens will continue to face disadvantages due to their religious 
membership.
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